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Inequalities in income and education and regional economic growth in 
western Europe 
Abstract 
Does inequality matter for regional growth? This paper addresses this question by using 
microeconomic data for more than 100,000 individuals over a period of 5 years from the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) dataset, complemented with Eurostat’s Regio data, in order 
to examine the impact of income and educational distribution on regional economic growth. 
Educational distribution is measured in terms of educational achievement as well as educational 
inequality, and income distribution in terms of income per capita and income inequality, not only 
for the whole of the population, but also for normally working people. Our results indicate that, 
given existing levels of inequality, an increase in a region’s income and educational inequality has a 
significant positive relationship with subsequent economic growth. Nevertheless, the reverse does 
not seem to be the case, as we do not find a causal link between growth and changes in inequality 
levels. Despite the fact that educational achievement is positively correlated with economic growth, 
the results also suggest that inequalities in income and educational attainment levels matter more for 
economic performance than average income and educational attainment, respectively. Initial income 
levels, in contrast, are irrelevant for regional economic growth as they are very sensitive to the 
inclusion of control variables. 
Keywords: Income inequality, educational attainment, educational inequality, economic growth, 
regions, Europe  
3
1. Introduction 
The linkage between inequality and growth is far from being well understood, especially at 
a regional level. When looking at the effects of income and educational inequality on 
regional economic growth, we are primarily interested in the ways in which distribution can 
affect aggregate output and growth through its impact on different channels. The impact of 
inequality on growth remains controversial and decades of economic, sociological, and 
political studies offer evidence that the inequality-growth relationship is, indeed, complex 
(Galor 2000; Galor and Moav 2004). There is a range of theoretical and empirical evidence 
suggesting that inequality can actually be good for growth (i.e. Mirrlees 1971; Rebelo 
1991), while other studies support the idea that inequality may harm growth (i.e. Perotti 
1996; Easterly 2001). 
This paper aims at shedding light on the inequality-growth relationship at a regional level in 
western Europe. Do income and educational inequalities matter for growth? To what extent 
are inequalities associated with growth at a regional level? The focal point is to examine 
how microeconomic changes in income and educational distribution for a sample of more 
that 100,000 individuals across regions in Europe affect the evolution of regional economic 
growth. Microeconomic changes in income and in human capital endowments are measured 
by average and inequality levels. As this paper contributes to two different strands within 
the field of economic growth, income per capita, educational attainment and growth, on the 
one hand, and inequality and growth, on the other, it also tries to determine which of these 
factors prevails in shaping growth. On this ground, it discriminates between endowments 
and inequality in wealth and education. Finally, we also attempt to synthesise the impact of 
both inequalities on growth, comparing the magnitude and significance of their coefficients. 
The methodology is based on the estimation of static regression models. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, the theoretical 
underpinnings of the impact of income and educational inequalities on regional economic 
growth are presented. Section 3 illustrates the econometric specification and the regression 
results of growth models. The last section discusses the conclusions, the implications, and 
the limits of the results. 
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2. Theoretical considerations 
2.1 The impact of income inequality on regional economic growth 
A number of economic theories and arguments have been constructed in the quest to 
uncover the link between income inequality and economic growth. They are focused on in 
the ways in which distribution can affect aggregate output and growth through its impact on 
different channels (Aghion et al. 1999), such as incentives, investments in physical and 
human capital, and habits. What are the possible transition mechanisms that might link 
inequality and growth? A number of arguments have been made as to why more or less 
egalitarian societies can actually be good for growth and why redistribution policies from 
rich to poor and government interventions may harm or enhance growth. 
First of all, the relationship between economic growth and income inequality is determined 
by economic incentives. The operation of the free market in the pursuit of private profit not 
only provides strong incentives for work, but may also generate inequalities 
(Champernowne and Cowell 1998). Many sociologists and economists — going back to 
Adam Smith — support the idea that inequality is fundamentally good for incentives and 
therefore should be viewed as being growth-enhancing (Mirrlees 1971; Rebelo 1991; 
Aghion et al. 1998). Inequality promotes a productive economy by creating incentives and 
encouraging competition. Free markets provide signals that can help to optimise 
production, resulting in greater gains, but not necessarily in lower income inequality 
(Heyns 2005, p. 167). Along these lines, Voitchovsky (2005, p. 276) argues that in an 
economic structure where ability is rewarded, effort, productivity, and risk-taking will also 
be encouraged, generating higher growth rates and income inequality as a result. Hence, the 
greater the income inequality, the stronger the incentive to invest either in physical or in 
human capital, and thus the higher the growth rate. Barro (2000) states that this is the case 
only if investments incur high costs in relation to median income that may only be in the 
range of very wealthy agents. Incentives appear to stimulate predominately the production 
of such goods and services that only the rich can afford to buy, rather than to enable the 
poor to buy the goods that they most urgently need. Without incentives, entrepreneurial and 
business activity and risk-taking might cease, capital markets would dry up and economic 
growth would grind to a halt (Heyns 2005, p. 165). Any public policy aimed at reducing  
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income inequality may produce negative incentives for economic efficiency and, therefore, 
may harm economic growth. Such policies include the taxation system and public housing 
policies, among the key devices used to redistribute income (Lui 1997; Chang 1998). 
Champernowne and Cowell (1998, p. 16) demonstrate that strong policies of redistribution 
may hamper the ability of exceptionally efficient and successful firms and entrepreneurs to 
expand and attract staff with the best talents by offering them the inducement of unusually 
high pay. Thus, in a laissez-faire economy, in which government intervention is minimal, 
inequality is fundamentally good for incentives, which, in turn, enhance growth. In contrast 
to this view, equality may also empower a greater number of individuals and increase 
activity in the market place (Austen, 2002; Gijsberts, 2002). 
Income inequality can affect growth through investments in physical and human capital. 
Classical economists (i.e. Keynes 1920; Kaldor 1956) support the notion that more income 
inequality favours physical capital accumulation, because rich agents have a higher 
marginal propensity to save compared to the poor.
1 This increases aggregate savings which, 
in turn, increases growth rates. Contrary to the classical approach, recent work (Galor 2000; 
Galor and Moav 2000; 2004) suggests that the relationship between income inequality and 
growth depends on the stage of economic development (or industrialisation). During the 
early stages of economic development, physical capital accumulation is the prime engine of 
economic growth. High initial income inequality stimulates high aggregate savings that, in 
turn, increase physical capital accumulation. Physical capital then stimulates the process of 
economic development. Hence, income inequality enhances economic development by 
channelling resources towards individuals with a higher propensity to save. At later stages 
of economic development, human capital accumulation replaces the accumulation of 
physical capital as the prime engine of growth, due to capital-skill complementarity. During 
the economic process, the increased availability of physical capital raises the return on 
investment in human capital. However, due to credit market imperfections (Galor and Zeira 
1993; Bénabou 1994; 2000; 2002), the poor may find their access to human capital 
                                                 
1 Most empirical studies support the theory of a positive relationship between inequality and savings (Kelley 
and Williamson 1968). Smith (2001), however, has found evidence that income inequality affects savings 
only in countries with low levels of financial market development.  
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curtailed.
2 Thus, in sufficiently wealthy economies, equality may stimulate investment in 
human capital which promotes economic growth, because human capital accumulation is 
greater if it is shared by a larger segment of the society. In other words, equality promotes 
growth via investment in human capital, because more individuals are able to invest in 
human capital (Perotti 1996; Easterly 2001); and equality could alleviate the adverse effect 
of credit market constraints on human capital accumulation (Galor and Moav 2004). 
Furthermore, during the process of development, the constraints on the credit market 
gradually diminish, differences in savings behaviour between rich and poor agents decline, 
and the effect of income inequality on economic growth becomes insignificant (Galor and 
Moav 2004, p. 1021). Nevertheless, Bénabou (1994) argues that even minor imperfections 
in capital markets can lead to a high degree of stratification. Low levels of income 
inequality facilitate positive changes for regions, as they offer plenty of economic chances 
to both advantaged and disadvantaged groups. This allows for a better allocation of 
resources and more efficiency in physical and human capital investments. For instance, by 
lowering income inequalities, fewer people under-invest in education because of credit 
market imperfections (Galor and Zeira 1993; Galor and Moav 2000). Finally, taking only 
physical capital into consideration, Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Aghion and Bolton 
(1997) support the notion that with credit market imperfections, equality positively affects 
an individual’s physical capital investment opportunities. In brief, the effect of inequality 
on economic growth depends not only on the region’s level of income, but also on the 
relative returns to physical and human capital. 
Income inequality and economic growth are closely interlinked with habits. 
Champernowne and Cowell (1998, p. 16) argue that once people are accustomed to a 
degree of comfort they will regard it as a hardship to return to an earlier and lower standard 
of living. This means that a rapid reduction in income inequality is likely to slow down or 
even halt economic progress, highlighting the difficulty of the adjustment process. 
                                                 
2 Flug et al. (1998), for example, show that economic volatility — lack of financial markets, income or 
employment volatility, and income inequality — has a negative effect on the accumulation of human capital. 
Dixit and Pindyck (1993) show that uncertainty also has a negative effect on investment in physical capital. 
Flug et al. (1998) argue that volatility has a stronger correlation with investment in human capital than with 
investment in physical capital.  
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The relationship between income inequality within a nation and economic growth can also 
be investigated through political economy models such as the voting models (i.e. Perotti 
1992; Aghion et al. 1999), but it is not clear-cut. The basic argument for the negative effect 
of inequality on growth is that the higher the income inequality, the higher the rate of 
taxation, the lower the incentive to invest, and the lower the growth rate (Bertola 1993; 
Persson and Tabellini 1994). The argument in support of a positive effect, on the other 
hand, is that the higher the income inequality, the higher the rate of taxation, the larger the 
expenditure on public education programmes, and thus the higher the public investment in 
human capital, and the higher the growth rate (Aghion and Bolton 1990; Saint-Paul and 
Verdier 1993).
3 Hence, the trade-off between the incentive to invest (which is the 
fundamental mechanism of a laissez-faire economy) and the expenditure on public 
education programmes (which reflects a fundamental government policy) determines the 
inequality-growth relationship. 
The effect of income inequality within a nation on economic growth also depends upon the 
effect of socio-political instability (i.e. Mauro 1995; Alesina and Perotti 1996). This 
channel plays a key role in the inequality-growth relationship of less-developed countries 
beset by political and social unrest or violence, such as some African and Latin American 
countries, but is less relevant for European countries. In a society with considerable income 
inequality, the gap between the mean income and the potential legal income of low-skilled 
workers is large, and hence this is likely to give incentives for the very poor to engage in 
disruptive activities such as crimes against property and crimes of violence (Nilsson 2004, 
p. 3). Additionally, the more unequal the distribution of income, the higher the probability 
for disruptive activities and protests, and the higher the frequency of government changes. 
Thus, when the gap between rich and poor widens, the poor may experience a greater 
temptation to engage in disruptive activities that are usually at the expense of the rich 
(Bénabou 1996). The above cases accentuate the negative effect of inequalities on growth. 
                                                 
3 Nevertheless, Sylwester (2000) stresses that the larger the expenditure on public education programmes, the 
lower the growth rate.  
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The empirical research that has been carried out on the effect of income inequality on 
economic growth is less unambiguous than the theory. The vast majority of the reduced-
form estimates find that inequality has a negative effect on growth (i.e. Persson and 
Tabellini 1994; Perotti 1996; Barro 2000). Less empirical studies support the positive effect 
of inequality on growth (i.e. Li and Zou 1999; Forbes 2000). For instance, Forbes (2000) 
uses panel estimation and her results suggest that in the short and medium term, an increase 
in a country’s level of income inequality has a significant positive relationship with 
subsequent economic growth. Her estimates are highly robust across samples, variable 
definitions, and model specifications. Nonetheless, all the above studies examine the 
relationship between income inequality within a nation and economic growth, while the 
regional dimension has been virtually overlooked with the exception of Partridge (2005) or 
Ezcurra (2007). 
2.2 The impact of educational inequality on regional economic growth 
Economic performance depends increasingly on talent, creativity, knowledge, skills, and 
experiences. In modern economies, those characteristics shape opportunities and rewards 
(Wolf 2002, p. 14). Although educational attainment has gained a central role in economic 
growth analysis (i.e. Stokey 1991; Barro 2001), the link between educational inequality and 
economic performance is less straightforward than it may appear. The literature on the 
influence of educational inequality on economic growth is limited. We analyse the 
contributions of incentives, technological progress in production, and life expectancy to the 
relationship between educational inequality and growth. 
As mentioned earlier, inequality is fundamentally good for incentives and therefore should 
be viewed as being growth-enhancing (Mirrlees 1971; Rebelo 1991; Aghion et al. 1998). 
Not only income inequality, but also educational inequality, could be good for incentives. 
The greater the educational inequality, the greater the incentive for an individual to attain a 
higher educational level and more academic qualifications and training. However, most 
people require qualifications that are not possessed by everyone (Wolf 2002). The existence 
of less talented and educated people implies incentives to seize the higher returns for ones 
skills (Voitchovsky 2005). As Chiswick (1974, p. 17) says  
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‘since human capital is created at a cost, no one would willingly invest in 
human capital unless it generated sufficient monetary or nonmonetary benefits 
to compensate for the cost’. 
This is likely to enhance economic growth. 
Educational inequality also determines growth through technological progress. In the early 
stages of economic development, a wide distribution of human capital might be a necessary 
condition for take-off. Inequality encourages members of the highly-educated segments of 
society to increase their investment in human capital, while equality traps the society as a 
whole at a low level of investment in human capital (Galor and Tsiddon 1997, p. 94). 
Inequality is essential for a region to increase the aggregate level of human capital and 
output. In addition, economic growth is affected by the percentage of individuals who 
inherit a large enough amount of wealth to enable them to invest in human capital (Galor 
and Zeira 1993, p. 51) and only rich people are able to do so. The parental level of human 
capital, which is known as the home (or local) environment externality is a critical factor in 
the positive inequality-growth relationship. The importance of the parental education input 
in the formation of the child’s education has been stressed in studies by Becker and Tomes 
(1986) and Coleman (1990). Local human capital externalities may also lock-in income 
inequality across generations (Bénabou 1994). In the mature stages of economic 
development, technological progress is positively related to the level of human capital in 
society (Schultz 1975). The growth process may increase the rate of adoption of new 
technologies, which induces income convergence via diffusion. More specifically, as the 
investment in human capital of the highly-educated increases, the accumulated knowledge 
trickles down to the less-educated via a technological progress in production which is 
known as the global production externality (Galor and Tsiddon 1997, p. 94). 
The relationship between educational inequality and economic growth is also affected by 
life expectancy. Investment in human capital depends on the individual’s life expectancy, 
which, in turn, depends to a large extent on the environment in which individuals grow up. 
An individual’s level of human capital is not only an increasing function of the parental 
level of human capital, but also a function of the number of children born to their parents 
and life expectancy (de la Croix and Licandro 1999; Kalemli-Özcan 2002).  
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Due to the lack of available data on educational inequality, little attention has been paid to 
the empirical impact of inequality on growth (i.e. Birdsall and Londono 1997; López et al. 
1998; Castelló and Doménech 2002). Most empirical studies use the international data on 
educational attainment of Barro and Lee (1993; 1996; 2001). Birdsall and Londono (1997) 
explored the impact of the distribution of assets (both physical and human capital) on 
growth. They placed emphasis on human capital accumulation via basic education and 
health. Their results illustrate a significant negative correlation between education 
dispersion and economic growth. López et al. (1998) demonstrated that the unequal 
distribution of education tends to have a negative effect on growth, while an increase in 
mean education has a positive impact. The impact of education on growth is also affected 
by the macroeconomic policy environment of a country, which determines what people can 
do with their education. For example, policy reforms can increase the returns from formal 
education and enhance the impact of education on growth through trade and investment. 
López et al. (1998) also showed that the distribution of education is related to technological 
progress and industrial upgrading. They emphasise the interaction of human capital 
distribution and policy reforms on economic growth. Finally, Castelló and Doménech 
(2002) found a negative relationship between human capital inequality and growth for a 
broad panel of countries. This negative relationship exists not only through the efficiency of 
resource allocation, but also through a reduction in investment rates. They argue that 
countries which showed higher educational inequality had experienced lower investment 
rates and less efficiency in resource allocation than countries which registered lower levels 
of human capital inequality. The lower the investment rates and the lower the efficiency in 
the allocation of resources, the lower the growth rates. Their educational inequality 
measures provide more robust results than the income inequality measures. 
To sum up, educational inequality is a significant factor in the economic process and 
economic growth rates. Although the theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of 
educational inequality on growth is more than limited, the existing literature provides much 
insight into the inequality-growth relationship.  
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3. Econometric specification, data and regression results 
The combined impact of income and educational inequality on regional economic growth is 
given by the following econometric specification. 
it it it it it it t i u x EducIneq EducAtt IncIneq Incpc Growth + + + + + = + ' ' ' ' ' 5 4 3 2 1 2 , β β β β β  
with  i denoting regions ( N i ,..., 1 = ) and t time ( 3 ,..., 1 = t )
4;  2 , + t i Growth  is two-year 
regional economic growth;  it Incpc  is income per capita;  it IncIneq  is income inequality; 
it EducAtt  is educational attainment;  it EducIneq  is educational inequality;  it x  is a vector of 
control variables;  5 ,..., 1 β  are coefficients; and  it u  is the composite error. 
Table 1 shows the description and sources of the main and the control variables. The main 
novelty of this study will be the use of microeconomic data in order to measure intra-
regional inequality in income and human capital endowment at a regional level in Europe. 
Microeconomic variables will be extracted from the European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP) data survey during the period 1994-2001
5 and complemented by 
macroeconomic variables from the Eurostat’s Regio dataset.
6 The ECHP dataset is based on 
NUTS regions’ version 1995 and the Eurostat’s Regio one on NUTS regions’ version 2002. 
The elaboration process of both datasets is coordinated by Eurostat, making comparisons 
reliable. However, some adjustment of regions in order to match different datasets is 
required. Additionally, the major limitation of Eurostat’s Regio dataset is that regional 
economic development is not instantaneous, so that changes in economic development from 
one year to the next are probably too short term to be really useful. Although the payoff for 
panel data is over long time periods (i.e. five years), changes in economic development 
                                                 
4  1 = t  denotes 1996,  2 = t  denotes 1998 and  3 = t  denotes 2000. 
5 The surveys were conducted regularly during the period 1994-2001 at approximately one-year intervals. In 
these surveys between 104,953 and 124,663 individuals were interviewed about their socioeconomic status 
and information is collected about their income changes, job changes, education status, living places, age etc. 
For a review of the ECHP, see Peracchi (2002). 
6 This type of panel data consists of repeated observations on larger entities, the individual regions (NUTS) of 
the EU.  
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(growth) are calculated every two years, because the data cover a short time span for each 
region. 
Insert Table 1 around here 
The estimates of growth equations are pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS), Fixed Effects 
(FEs), and Random Effects (REs). To evaluate which technique is optimal, it is necessary 
to consider the relationship between the unobserved effect and the regressors. 
The p-values of Breusch and Pagan’s (1980) Lagrange Multiplier test fail to reject the 
validity of the pooled OLS estimates. Hence, the unobserved effect is uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables and each region is independent and identically distributed, ignoring 
the panel structure of the data and the information it provides (Johnston and Dinardo 1997). 
Table 2 depicts the OLS regression results when independent variables are income per 
capita and income inequality for the whole of the population, while Appendix A.1 displays 
the OLS regression results for normally working people.
7 F i n a l l y ,  t h e r e  i s  n o  m u c h  
difference between the significance of the homoskedasticity and the heteroskedasticity 
consistent covariance matrix estimator, showing that the determinants of regional economic 
growth are robust to the model specification about the error term. Thus, Table 2 presents 
only the homoskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator. 
Insert Table 2 around here 
3.1 Growth and income inequality 
The analysis performed here addresses the following model. 
it it it t i u IncIneq Incpc Growth + + = + ' ' 2 1 2 , β β  
Regression 1 illustrates the combined impact of the natural logarithm of income per capita 
and income inequality on regional economic growth. The elasticity coefficient on income 
per capita is negative indicating convergence. The findings also show the positive impact 
of existing income inequality on regional economic growth. Existing levels of inequality 
                                                 
7 The FEs and REs results are not reported because of space constraints, but may be obtained upon request.  
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across regions in Europe seem to be fundamentally good for incentives and therefore 
should be viewed as growth-enhancing (Mirrlees 1971; Rebelo 1991; Aghion et al. 1998). 
The results underline the view of classical economists who claim that a certain level of 
income inequality favours capital accumulation, because rich agents have a higher marginal 
propensity to save compared to the poor, increasing aggregate savings and growth. The 
results also are inconsistent with more recent approaches. These indicate that at the current 
stage of European development, equality stimulates investment in human capital which 
promotes growth, as human capital accumulation is greater if it is shared by the largest 
segment of the society. 
Income inequality has decreased slightly between 1995 and 2000 (Rodríguez-Pose and 
Tselios 2006). As mentioned earlier, Champernowne and Cowell (1998) argue that once 
people are accustomed to a degree of comfort they will regard it as a hardship to return to 
an earlier and lower standard of living. Thus, a rapid reduction in income inequality is 
likely to slow down economic progress, highlighting the difficulty of the adjustment 
process. Finally, considering the political economy models, the higher the income 
inequality, the higher the rate of taxation, the greater the expenditure on public education 
programmes, the higher the public investment in human capital, and the higher the 
(national) economic growth (Saint-Paul and Verdier 1993).
 8 
3.2 Growth and educational inequality 
The analysis performed here addresses the combined impact of educational attainment and 
inequality as in the following model. 
it it it t i u EducIneq EducAtt Growth + + = + ' ' 4 3 2 , β β  
The results are presented in Regression 2. The positive coefficient on educational 
attainment highlights, as expected, the importance of education in laying the basis for 
                                                 
8 Considering the model  it it it it t i u x IncIneq Incpc Growth + + + = + ' ' ' 5 2 1 2 , β β β , the elasticity 
coefficient on income per capita is very sensitive to the inclusion of additional variables, while the coefficient 
on income inequality is robust (the results are provided upon request).  
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sustained regional growth (Hannum and Buchmann 2005). The positive coefficient also 
points to the major role of education not only in increasing the individual’s capacity, but 
also in facilitating the process of adaptation to new technologies so as to speed up the 
diffusion of technology throughout the EU (Aghion et al. 1998). Education seems to allow 
those European regions with currently less advanced technologies to learn more from 
advanced regions and thereby help the former to achieve a higher degree of productivity 
improvement when innovating, and thus a higher growth rate. The impact of education on 
growth may, however, hide that the role of the education system is not to help individual 
growth, but rather to sort individuals to fill slots in the labour market (Hannum and 
Buchmann 2005). Education also has implications for the optimal capital structure. 
Technologically advanced societies build more human capital relative to physical capital 
(Aghion et al. 1998). 
The positive coefficient on educational inequality denotes the fact that existing levels of 
inequality are fundamentally good for incentives and growth-enhancing (Mirrlees 1971; 
Rebelo 1991; Aghion et al. 1998) as most people require qualifications that are not 
possessed by everyone. Hence, inequality seems to create an incentive for people to 
increase their returns on investment in human capital by enabling members of the highly-
educated segments of society to increase their investment in human capital, while avoiding 
the risk of a low level of investment in human capital trap (Galor and Tsiddon 1997, p. 
94).
9 
3.3 Growth and income and educational inequality 
Regressions 3-13 show the combined impact of income inequality and educational 
inequality on regional economic growth. 
The findings show an ambiguous impact of income per capita on growth: the elasticity 
coefficient on income per capita now becomes statistically insignificant. The coefficient on 
educational attainment, in contrast, remains positive, significant, and robust to the inclusion 
                                                 
9 Considering the model  it it it it t i u x EducIneq EducAtt Growth + + + = + ' ' ' 5 4 3 2 , β β β , the coefficients 
on educational attainment and inequality are robust (the results are provided upon request).  
15
of additional control variables. The results also show that the higher the income and 
educational inequality, the higher the growth rate. This finding is also robust. 
We assess the robustness of our findings in income and education levels and inequality by 
introducing a series of control variables in the model. These control variables cover a series 
of factors generally regarded to affect economic performance at a regional level. They 
include different aspects of population ageing, access to employment, infrastructure 
endowment, geography, and institutions – ranging from welfare regimes to family 
structures. The specific control variables and their sources are presented in Table 1.  
Our first control variable is population ageing (Regression 4). Its coefficient is statistically 
insignificant. This seems to support Disney’s (1996) finding that the relationship between 
an population ageing and productivity is unclear.
10 
We also control for access to work which is measured as the percentage of normally 
working respondents (source: ECHP) (Regression 4) and as the economic activity rate of 
total population (source: EUROSTAT) (Regression 5). The results show a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient on the latter proxy for access to work, but not for the 
former.
11 This results in doubts about whether at a regional level in Europe, first, high 
participation in the labour market contributes to a competitive economic environment, 
which promotes allocative efficiency (Azzoni and Silveira-Neto 2005), and second, 
                                                 
10 Nevertheless, for normally working people, the coefficient on population ageing is negative and statistically 
significant (see Regression 7 in Appendix A.1). This may show that older workers are, on average, less 
productive than younger ones for several reasons (Tang and MacLeod 2006). First, younger and older workers 
differ in their levels of technology adoption, as the former are the primary adopters and beneficiaries of new 
technologies that are most probably more productive than old technologies, while the latter tend to be more 
set in their ways and less willing to learn new ways of doing things (Galenson and Weinberg 2000). Second, 
both types of workers differ in work effort, as younger workers tend to work more hours and are able to 
concentrate more on the job, they are healthier on average and thus take fewer days in sick leave than older 
workers (Cheal 2000). Since productivity declines as a worker gets closer to retirement (Bhattacharya and 
Russell 2001), population ageing has a negative impact on regional economic growth. Hence, differences in 
technology adoption and work effort may lead to different productive capacities across different age groups of 
the workforce. A somewhat different view has been built on the assumption that retired people tend to spend 
their savings, decreasing capital investment, while working people save for their retirement. (Futagami and 
Nakajima 2001). 
11 However, this variable is not statistically significant when explanatory variable is income per capita and 
income inequality for normally working people (see Appendix A.1).  
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whether high labour force participation implies high work-related education and training 
which are positively associated with wage and growth (Lynch 1992; Parent 1999). 
We then control for unemployment and inactivity. While the coefficient on unemployment 
is not statistically significant, the positive and statistically significant coefficient on 
inactivity accords well with the theoretical work of Hall (1991) and Caballero and 
Hammour (1994), which emphasise that recessions may stimulate growth. More 
specifically, inactivity may stimulate efficiency gains by causing less efficient firms to exit, 
and may encourage firms to adopt reorganising investments and innovative activities. The 
findings seem to reject the view that the higher the inactivity, the higher the skill losses, the 
greater the unexploited opportunities for learning-by-doing and the greater the 
inefficiencies in the production of human capital, and thus the lower the regional growth 
rate (Stadler 1990; Muscatelli and Tirelli 2001). 
Our final labour force control is the female participation in the labour market (Regression 
6), as work access differs by gender. Women and men, on average, occupy different 
positions, with women traditionally more likely to be poor and less-educated relative to the 
position of men, implying gender wage and social differentials. The results of the impact of 
women’s work access on growth are positive and statistically significant. A higher female 
work access is likely to stimulate growth, because higher employment means greater level 
of inputs and firms can produce more. However, economic inefficiencies arise from 
persisting gender differentials in the labour market (Tzannatos 1999). Hence, higher 
women’s participation in the labour market increases the economic efficiency. 
The influence of transport infrastructure on growth is examined in Regression 8. Most 
studies (Aschauer 1989; Banister and Berechman 2000) have accepted the position that 
transport infrastructure contributes positively to economic growth for many reasons. The 
net benefits associated with public transport infrastructure are related to increases in the net 
local income, which stem from either private investments due to the reductions in transport 
costs and travel times, or positive externalities as the income of the non-users of the 
infrastructure may increase due to increases in local demand on the part of the 
infrastructure users (McCann and Shefer 2004). An increase in the level of connectivity 
implies a greater ability on the part of local firms to develop profitable market relationships  
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with firms and consumers. Firms that are located in areas with a better infrastructure will be 
more integrated into the market system and more exposed to competition and, thus, under 
more pressure to improve productivity (Vickerman 1991; Deichmann et al. 2004). 
Therefore, infrastructure can contribute to growth, either directly as a measurable final 
product, or indirectly as an intermediate input, because infrastructure enhances the 
productivity of all other inputs in producing output (Wang 2002) and generates positive 
externalities. These views are, nevertheless, opposed by our results. While the coefficient 
on road infrastructure is not statistically significant, the coefficient on rail infrastructure is 
negative and significant.
12 This is likely to show that while a transport infrastructure may 
encourage development in under-developed regions, its construction alone will not be 
enough to bring about the desired economic changes (McCann and Shefer 2004, p. 179). 
Other factors such as the resource endowments of the region, the economic climate in the 
region, the prices of input factors of production, government policies, or historically 
developed infrastructure would tend to determine the economic viability of a region far 
more than its transport infrastructures (Vickerman 1991; McCann and Shefer 2004). Our 
results are consistent with the studies of Holtz-Eakin (1994) and Holtz-Eakin and Lovely 
(1996). The negative impact of the rail infrastructure is likely to show more limited benefits 
than other modes of transport infrastructure. However, bearing in mind that data for only a 
few regions were available, some caution is called for in the interpretation of the results. 
The findings for urbanisation (Regression 9) show that the higher the urbanisation level 
within a region, the higher the growth rate.
 13 Urbanisation seems to spur economic growth, 
because city-regions are full of technological and pecuniary externalities. Cities allow 
                                                 
12 Since the transport infrastructure of 1995-2000 has been constructed over a great many years, both 
variables may reflect lagged requirements and patterns of development rather than current and prospective 
ones (European Commission 1999). Additionally, the physical scale measurement does not give a clear 
picture of infrastructure stock, because it is extremely difficult to approach the estimation of the qualitative 
characteristics of the infrastructure capacity (Rovolis and Spence 2002, p. 394). Questions related to 
infrastructure measurements remain open to be analysed in greater depth (Haughwout 1998; European 
Commission 1999). Nevertheless, indicators neither of scale nor of quality can convey how the existing 
transport endowment in any region is suitable to its regional development needs (European Commission 1999, 
p. 122). Therefore, the indicators devised need to be interpreted with caution. 
13 This variable is not statistically significant when explanatory variable is income per capita and income 
inequality for normally working people (see Appendix A.1).  
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goods, ideas and people to come together for the purposes of exchange and production 
(Polese 2005). This, in turn, allows regions to reap the gains from trade and specialisation, 
enhancing growth. Additionally, cities foster and facilitate flows of local knowledge, the 
creation of dense social networks, and the production of behavioural and cultural change. In 
cities, people have face-to-face contact which is a fundamental condition of tacit 
knowledge spillovers. The interaction between people promotes innovation, continually 
pushing up productivity and growth (Jacobs 1970). At the European regional level, the 
economic benefits of urbanisation seem to outweigh its potential costs. The benefits of 
urbanisation arise due to the presence of knowledge spillovers among firms in an industry 
(Marshall 1890), a buildup of knowledge and ideas associated with historical diversity 
(Jacobs 1970), the local competition of an industry, and the lower infrastructure, 
information, transaction, training and recruitment costs (Polese 2005); while the costs arise 
due to the commuting expenditures within cities, the substantial pollution, and the 
pervasive traffic congestion (Bertinelli and Black 2004). The economic costs also arise 
from the pressure posed by geographic concentration on urban factor markets that bids up 
prices and from dispersed demand (Martin and Ottaviano 2001). 
We then examine the impact of latitude on growth (Regression 10). We include this 
variable in our analysis, because a number of cross-country studies (Gallup et al. 1999; 
Masters and McMillan 2001) have found latitude to be an important factor in accounting 
for differences in cross-country economic growth rates. However, the coefficient on 
latitude is not statistically significant. 
We finally control for the influence of some institutional factors such as welfare state 
(Regression 11), religion (Regression 12), and family structure (Regression 13). The 
findings show that regional growth is lowest in countries with a ‘residual’ welfare state 
regime (Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece), while Anglican and Orthodox areas have the 
highest growth rate; and that the nationally-based definition of family structure we use 
(Berthoud and Iacovou 2004) does not matter for growth. More specifically, although it is 
difficult to disentangle the mixture of incentives and disincentives of the welfare state 
because it is a conglomerate of different targeted programmes (Herce et al. 2001), when  
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controlling for income and educational levels and inequality, growth rates are lower in 
Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. 
None of the control variables introduced in the model altered the significance and the 
direction of the coefficients for the variables depicting income and educational levels and 
inequality, making the positive association between educational attainment and economic 
growth and between income and educational inequality and growth robust to changes in the 
specification of the model. 
Finally, considering the standardised coefficients for the above regressions (Appendix A.3), 
educational attainment, income inequality and educational inequality explain the largest 
variation in growth rate. The results also suggest that inequalities in income and educational 
attainment levels matter more for economic performance than average income and 
educational attainment, respectively. Nonetheless, no matter how income inequality is 
defined, the low adjusted R-squared depicts that income and human capital variables 
account for a relatively low proportion of the variation in regional economic growth level 
differences. 
3.4 Causality 
The theoretical arguments advocate a causal link between inequality and economic growth. 
Yet the number of studies on this topic is limited. The empirical impact of growth on 
inequality has attracted less attention than vice versa. Mocan (1999), for instance, argued 
that growth is not necessarily associated with an improvement in income inequality, 
because growth can coexist with increased unemployment. Aghion et al. (1999), on the 
other hand, found that growth may increase wage inequality, both across and within 
education cohorts, and that technical change is a crucial factor in explaining this 
relationship. Finally, Griffin and Khan (1972) and Papanek and Kyn (1986) posit that a 
high rate of growth increases inequality because it requires great rewards for higher income 
groups such as inventors, managers, and land owners. The question addressed here is: ‘does 
regional economic growth increase income and educational inequality?’ 
Table 3 reports the OLS, FEs, and REs results for the impact of regional economic growth 
on inequality. The statistical evidence is in favour of the FEs models. The findings show  
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that the impact of growth on income and educational inequality is not statistically 
significant. Hence, our result do not support the causal link between inequality and growth. 
Insert Table 3 around here 
5. Concluding remarks and further research 
Both income and educational distributions are basic determinants in regional economic 
growth analyses. First, there are arguments that have been made so as to why more or less 
skewed income distributions can actually be good for growth and why government 
interventions may harm or enhance growth. Second, educational distribution is also seen as 
the engine of economic growth and so is central to any modern economy. Wolf (2002, p. 
244), for instance, argued that education now matters for growth more than ever before in 
history, but only when individuals have the right qualifications, they are studying the right 
subjects, and they are in the right institutions. However, the combined impact of both 
income and educational distribution on growth is far from being well understood and is 
indeed complex. 
This is especially the case at a regional level in Europe where the issue has been hardly 
addressed. The limited existing theoretical and empirical literature shows that there is a 
high correlation between income and educational inequalities (Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios 
2006). This paper has addressed using a microeconomic analysis of income and educational 
distribution, measured by average and inequality levels, whether this link also affects the 
economic performance of regions across Europe and whether any potential correlation is 
affected by the introduction of other variables. 
As a whole, our results indicate that both income and educational inequality matter for 
regional growth. Existing levels of income and education inequality seem to be 
fundamentally good for socioeconomic incentives and thus should be considered as growth-
enhancing. The statistical analysis performed in this paper does, however, not favour 
causality. The findings also suggest that the impact of income per capita of any region is 
irrelevant for regional growth in the EU as the elasticity coefficient on income per capita is 
very sensitive to the inclusion of income inequality, education, and other control variables. 
Our results also concur with the general belief that educational achievement has a positive  
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relationship with economic growth. The above findings are robust to the definition of 
income distribution. 
One of the major difficulties in this study is that multiple direct and indirect linkages exist 
among income distribution, educational distribution, and regional economic growth, and 
common factors, such as population ageing, unemployment, inactivity and work access 
exert their influence on them. Despite this complexity, the results show clearly that on the 
whole, the association between inequality in income and growth across regions in western 
Europe is stronger than that between growth and levels of income, as well as the association 
between inequality in education and growth is stronger than that between growth and 
educational attainment. 
The findings have important policy implications. Existing income and human capital 
inequality are likely to increase growth, but the magnitude of their impact is small. 
Nevertheless, increasing inequality does not emerge as a simple remedy for increasing 
growth due to their direct and indirect linkages and to the fact that changes in the level of 
income and educational inequality towards greater or lower inequality may tilt the positive 
influence they currently have on economic incentives beyond the threshold in which the 
incentives become disincentives. Policy-makers should also take into account that the 
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Table 1: Variables 
Variable Description  Sources 
Growth  Two-year regional economic growth  EUROSTAT 
Natural logarithm of income 
per capita 
(a) Natural logarithm of income per capita for 
the whole of the population (/1000) 
(b) Natural logarithm of income per capita for 
normally working (15+ hours/week) people 
(/1000) 
ECHP 
Income inequality  (a) Income inequality for the whole of the 
population (Theil index) 
(b) Income inequality for normally working 
(15+ hours/week) people (Theil index)  
ECHP 
Educational attainment  Average in education level completed   ECHP 
Educational inequality  Inequality in education level completed (Theil 
index) 
ECHP 
Population ageing  The average age of respondents  ECHP 
Work access  (a) The percentage of normally working (15+ 
hours/week) respondents 
(b) The percentage of economic activity rate 




Unemployment  The percentage of unemployed respondents  ECHP 
Inactivity  The percentage of inactive respondents  ECHP 
Female’s work access  The percentage of female’s economic activity 
rate 
EUROSTAT 
Road stock (time-invariant)  The average of the length of road-motorways 
per square kilometres (1995-2000) 
EUROSTAT 
Rail capital (time-invariant)  The average of the length of railways per 
square kilometres (1995-2000) 
EUROSTAT 
Urbanisation (time-invariant)  The percentage of respondents who live in a 
densely populated area (1999-2000) 
ECHP 
Latitude (time-invariant) Latitude  GIS 
Welfare State 
Socialism (social-democratic)  Sweden, Denmark 
Liberal  United Kingdom, Ireland 
Corporatist (conservatism)  Luxembourg, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Austria 
Residual (‘Southern’)  Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece 
Esping-Andersen (1990), 
Ferrera (1996), Berthoud 
and Iacovou (2004) 
Religion 
Mainly Protestant  Sweden, Denmark, Northern Germany, 
Scotland 
Mainly Catholic  France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, 
Italy, Austria, Southern Germany, Belgium 
Mainly Orthodox  Greece 





Nordic (Scandinavian)  Sweden, Denmark 
North/Central  UK, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Germany, 
Austria 
Southern/Catholic  Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece 
Berthoud and Iacovou 
(2004) 
  
Table 2: OLS results 
(1)   
OLS FEs 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
Natural logarithm of 





























































































































Work access (source: 
ECHP) 
    -0.0222 
(0.0575) 
 
          
Work access (source: 
Eurostat) 
     0.0015 
(0.0007)**          
Unemployment        -0.0811 











I n a c t i v i t y         
 
0.2355 
(0.0890)***        
Female’s work 
access 
      0.0008 
(0.0006) 
0.0017 













        0 . 2 3 2 4  
(0.4618)    
   
Rail capital 
(fixed) 
        - 0 . 4 2 2 2  
(0.2435)*    
   
Urbanisation 
(fixed) 
         0 . 0 3 1 5  
(0.0167)*  
   
Latitude 
(fixed) 
          0 . 0 0 0 3  
(0.0008) 
   










R e s i d u a l             - 0 . 0 4 2 2  
(0.0213)** 
  
M a i n l y   C a t h o l i c               0 . 0 0 6 6  
(0.0091) 
 
M a i n l y   O r t h o d o x               0 . 0 2 9 6  
(0.0175)* 
 







































Adjusted  R-squared  0.0632 0.0533 0.1129 0.1327 0.1273 0.1647 0.1546 0.1746 0.0716 0.1512 0.1518 0.1941 0.1680 0.1484 













































      
NOTES: (*), (**), and (***) indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. LM test is the Lagrange Multiplier test for the random effects model based on the OLS residuals (Breusch and Pagan 1980). HAUSMAN test is the 
Hausman (1978) test for fixed or random effects.  
Table 3: Causality (1998, 2000) 
  Dependent Variable: Income iequality  Dependent Variable: Educational Inequality 
 (a)  OLS    (b) FEs  (c) REs  (a) OLS   (b) FEs  (c) REs 






































































0.4870 0.0061   0.7717 0.6406  












  304.83 
(0.0000) 
  
NOTES: (*), (**), and (***) indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. LM TEST is the Lagrange Multiplier test for the 






Appendix A.1: OLS results when independent variables are income per capita and income inequality for normally working people 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
Natural logarithm of 

























































































































Work access (source: 
ECHP) 
   -0.0682 
(0.0455) 
 
         
Work access (source: 
Eurostat) 
    0.0004 
( 0 . 0 0 0 5 )           
Unemployment       -0.0010 











Inactivity       
 
0.2570 
(0.0883)***        
Female’s work 
access 
















       0.5623 
(0.4483)    
   
Rail capital 
(fixed) 
       - 0 . 4 2 3 2  
(0.2396)*    
   
Urbanisation 
(fixed) 
        0 . 0 2 2 1  
(0.0165)   
   
Latitude 
(fixed) 
         - 0 . 0 0 0 3  
(0.0008) 
   










R e s i d u a l            - 0 . 0 3 7 0  
(0.0222)* 
  
M a i n l y   C a t h o l i c              0 . 0 0 8 1  
(0.0091) 
 
M a i n l y   O r t h o d o x              0 . 0 3 6 2  
(0.0177)** 
 









































Adjusted  R-squared  0.0962 0.1129 0.1271 0.1301 0.1498 0.1448 0.1716 0.0638 0.1314 0.1420 270  270  270 













































      
NOTES: (*), (**), and (***) indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. LM test is the Lagrange Multiplier test for the random effects model based on the OLS residuals (Breusch and Pagan 1980). HAUSMAN test is the 
Hausman (1978) test for fixed or random effects.  
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Appendix A.2: Standardised coefficients 
  REGR.  1 REGR.  2 REGR.  3 REGR.  5 REGR.  6 REGR.  7 REGR.  8 REGR.  9 REGR.  10 REGR.  11 
Natural logarithm of 
income  per  capita  -0.1290    0.0109 0.0207 0.0262 -0.0126  -0.0002  0.3839 -0.1845 -0.0263 
Income  inequality  0.1560   0.2175 0.1940 0.3495 0.3326 0.2540 0.5163 0.4691  0.3542 
Educational  attainment    0.3404 0.4913 0.5049 0.3373 0.3828 0.4377 0.2840 0.3293  0.3821 
Educational  inequality   0.5933 0.6109 0.6317 0.5290 0.5366 0.5525 0.3285 0.3182  0.5419 
Population  ageing        -0.0160 0.0214  -0.0083 -0.1037   -0.0020  -0.0065 
Work access (source: 
ECHP) 
   
-0.0362         
Work access (source: 
Eurostat) 
    
0.2194        
Unemployment      -0.0584    -0.0839  -0.0581 
Inactivity        0.3207      
Female’s  work  access       0.1569  0.3381   0.3775  0.1529 
Road stock 
(fixed) 
      
 0.0676     
Rail capital 
(fixed) 










      
 
   0.0459 
 
 
 
 